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WHEN THE BOSS STEPS OVER THE LINE:
SUPERVISOR LIABILITY UNDER TITLE VII
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past century, our country has witnessed enormous changes
in the workplace. From the Great Depression, to World War II, to
corporate down-sizing, the workplace has been in a constant state of
change. One product of the changes was the recognition that certain
employees were not receiving equal treatment. These employees
included minorities, women, the disabled, and older Americans.'
Members of these groups experienced difficulty obtaining employment
and they often faced discrimination and harassment on the job. In an
attempt to end unequal treatment, Congress initiated a federal plan to
eradicate discrimination in the workplace.
In 1964, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(hereinafter Title VII).2 Title VII prohibits discrimination by employers
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Congress
1. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1) (1994). When passing the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (hereinafter the ADEA) Congress said, "in the face of rising productivity
and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain
employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs." Id. Similarly,
when enacting the Americans With Disabilities Act (hereinafter the ADA) Congress
summarized the discrimination experienced by the disabled. For instance, 43,000,000 disabled
Americans face isolation and segregation in the workforce as well as outright exclusion. 42
U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)-(9) (1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). Title VII was only one portion of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. To view the remainder of the act, see id §§ 2000a-2000e-17. The purpose
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was:
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer jurisdiction upon the district
courts of the United States to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in
public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney General to institute suits to
protect constitutional rights in public facilities and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in federally assisted programs,
to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other purpos-
es.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a). The statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
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continued to legislate in the area of employment discrimination by
enacting two other major pieces of legislation. In 1967, Congress
enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (hereinafter the
ADEA).4 The ADEA prohibits discrimination "against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's age."5  More recently,
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (hereinafter the
ADA).6 The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against qualified disabled employees in the workplace.7
Since their passage, the federal courts have struggled to apply the
anti-discrimination employment laws in a consistent manner.8 This
inconsistency is personified by the controversy regarding whether
individual supervisors are liable under anti-discrimination employment
laws, particularly Title VII, for conduct directed at those they supervise.9
Federal courts disagree over whether an individual supervisor may be
held liable under Title VII.O
The source of the problem is § 2000e(b) of Title VII which defines
an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a
person."" The "any agent" language has been subject to inconsistent
interpretation and courts disagree as to what extent of liability, if any,
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Congress outlined the purpose of the ADEA when it said, "[i]t
is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help
employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." Id. § 621(b).
5. Id. § 623(a)(1).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
7. Id. The general rule stated in the statute is "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
8. See infra notes 26-57 and accompanying text.
9. Although the ADEA and ADA use similar reasoning, this comment will focus on
Title VII. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 18-56 and accompanying text.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (emphasis added). The ADA's definition of employer is almost
exactly the same. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). The ADEA has a similar definition of
employer except the minimum employee threshold is twenty employees. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b).
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this language imposes upon individual supervisors. 12  Title VII, the
ADEA, and the ADA each have a very similar definition of the term
employer, which causes many courts to use the same analysis when
examining any of the three statutes. 3 However, for purposes of this
comment, § 2000e(b) of Title VII will be the sole focus of the analysis. 4
This comment argues that Title VII mandates that individual
supervisors, in addition to their employers, who engage in prohibited
discrimination are liable under Title VII jointly 5 and severally 6 when
they exercise control over an employee's conditions of employment.'7
Part II of this comment begins with a brief overview of the case law as
it developed in the federal circuit courts. Part III outlines the legal
principles that give rise to individual supervisor liability, namely the plain
meaning of § 2000e(b) and expressions of congressional intent. Part IV
argues that supervisor liability is sound public policy. Finally, Part V
proposes a practical test for courts to apply when deciding issues of
supervisor liability.
II. CASE LAW
Supervisor liability is an issue that the Supreme Courti 8 needs to
12. See infra notes 26-57 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The
liability schemes under Title VII and the ADEA are essentially the same in aspects relevant
to this issue; they both limit civil liability to the employer."). See also, eg., Birkbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994); cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 666 (1994); York v.
Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n., 684 F.2d 360, 362 (6th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. AIC Sec.
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1280 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "Courts routinely apply
arguments regarding individual liability to all three statutes interchangeably. Therefore, we
will use other courts' interpretations of Title VII and the ADEA to help us in our decision.").
14. The purpose for only referring to Title VII is two-fold. First, a majority of the
decisions on supervisor liability deal with Title VII. Second, it is easier to refer to Title VII
in the comment. Discussing all three statutes may lead to confusion.
Although this comment will only focus on federal law, supervisor liability under state laws
is also an issue before state courts. For instance, in a recent Wisconsin Court of Appeals
decision, the court considered whether a supervisor should be held individually liable for his
or her acts. L.L.N. v. Clauder, 552 N.W.2d 879, 888-89 (Wis. App. 1996) (asserting a cause
of action for negligent supervision, rather than employment discrimination).
15. "Unitedly, combined or joined together in unity of interest or liability... [t]o be or
become liable to a joint obligation." BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 838 (6th ed. 1990).
16. "Distinctly, separately, apart from others. When applied to a number of persons the
expression severally liable usually implies that each one is liable alone." Id. at 1374.
17. Conditions of employment include the ability to hire, fire, or change the employees
conditions of employment.
18. For instance, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting,
despite the fact the Fourth Circuit was extremely divided over the issue of supervisor liability.
Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507,510 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666
1997]
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review because there are no unified principles or standards for evaluating
whether supervisors should be liable for discriminatory conduct among
the federal circuit courts. 9 Although many of the federal circuit courts
have considered the issue of supervisor liability, they are unable to agree
on one clear interpretation of the "any agent" language of § 2000e(b). 20
Contributing to the difficulty is the fact that the passage of Title VII
involved a series of political compromises. 21 Unfortunately, the product
of these compromises is an inconsistency between the enforcement
provisions of Title VII and its remedy provisions as originally enacted.'
The circuit court decisions fall into one of three categories: some courts
reject supervisor liability under Title VII,' other courts declare that
supervisors are subject to liability under Title VII,24 and still other
courts fall somewhere in the middle.'
(1994). For a discussion of the confusion in the Fourth Circuit, see infra notes 50-57 and
accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 26-57 and accompanying text.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(b) (1994).
21. Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability for EmployeelAgent
Defendants?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L. J. 39, 58 (1994). For a general discussion on the passage
of Title VII and the effect of the political compromises, see id. at 40-47.
22. Id. at 58. For a discussion of the inconsistencies between the remedy and
enforcement provisions, see infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1995); Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59
F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, No. 95-9066, 1996 WL 282485 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996);
Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1995); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66
F.3d 1295 (2nd Cir. 1995).
The Seventh Circuit has also denied supervisor liability. See, e.g., EEOC v. AIC Sec.
Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276 (7th Cir. 1995); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552 (7th Cir.
1995). However, a federal district court within the Seventh Circuit has imposed liability for
supervisors under the Family and Medical Leave Act (hereinafter the FMLA). Freemon v.
Foley 911 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The court stated that the definition of "employer"
in Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA differed from the definition of "employer" in the
FMLA. Id. at 330. Whereas Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA define "employer" by using
the "and any agent" language, the FMLA defines an "employer" as "any person who acts,
directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such em-
ployer." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) (1994). The court relied on the differences in the
definition of "employer" between the statutes to impose liability upon the supervisor.
Freemon, 911 F. Supp. at 330-31. It is interesting to consider that a supervisor may be held
liable for violating the FMLA, but that same supervisor would not be held liable for sexual
harassment, gender discrimination, age discrimination, or discrimination based on disability.
24. See, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. A.,
28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989); York v.
Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n., 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1982); Iacampo v. Hasbro, Inc., 929
F. Supp. 562 (D. R.I. 1996); Shoemaker v. Metro Info. Services, 910 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Va.
1996); Schallehn v. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
25. See, e.g., Birkbeck, 30 F.3d at 510; Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104.
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A. Courts That Reject Supervisor Liability
Courts that reject supervisory liability justify their decision in several
ways. Rather than accept the plain meaning of § 2000e(b) as a statement
of pure agency principles,26 these courts chose to impose respondeat
superior principles.2 7 For example, in Miller v. Maxwell's International
Inc., s the court conceded that the statutory construction argument was
valid, but concluded "'[t]he obvious purpose of this [agent] provision was
to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute."'29 The
effect of this interpretation is that employers are held liable for the
discriminatory acts of their agents, while the agent faces no liability at
aii.30
Another justification for the rejection of supervisor liability is to give
more weight to other portions of Title VII; for example, the fifteen
employee threshold included in the definition of an employer.3' The
fifteen employee threshold played an important role in Tomka v. Seiler
Corp.2 In Tomka, the court rejected the plain language of § 2000e(b)
and instead looked to the fifteen employee threshold as an expression of
Congress' intent to limit liability to entities with at least fifteen
employees.33 The court held that individual liability conflicted with the
fifteen employee threshold requirement.34  According to the Tomka
court, Congress did not mean to protect employers with less than fifteen
26. For an in-depth discussion of agency principles see infra notes 58-82 and
accompanying text.
27. Respondeat superior is defined as "[L]et the master answer. This doctrine or maxim
means that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his servant, and a princi-
pal for those of his agent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
28. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
29. Id. at 587 (quoting the lower district court); see also Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 381 ("By
incorporating the principles of respondeat superior into Title VII, Congress has required
employers to answer for prohibited acts of discrimination perpetrated by their employees.").
30. The supervisor may be subject to discipline by the employer, but any discipline is at
the discretion of the employer. For this reason, it may not be an effective method of
deterrence.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1994). An "employer" under Title VII is "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has [fifteen] or more employees for each working day."
Id. The ADA also has a fifteen employee threshold. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994). The
ADEA has a similar provision, but the employee threshold is twenty employees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (1994).
32. 66 F.3d 1295 (2nd Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the ramifications of Tomka, see
Susan Ritz, Suing Individual Defendants in Federal Court After "Tomka", N.Y. L.J., June 17,
1996, § Employment Law, at 7.
33. 66 F.3d at 1314.
34. Id.
1997]
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employees and impose liability on individuals who worked for larger
employers at the same time."
B. Courts That Accept Supervisor Liability
Another set of federal circuit courts take the opposite approach to
supervisor liability by holding a supervisor liable along with his or her
employer.36 These courts hold that the plain meaning of the "any
agent" language from § 2000e(b) compels supervisor liability. In York
v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Association,37 one of the first cases to
uphold supervisor liability, a supervisor was deemed liable because he
had been delegated authority by the employer. 8 The court, lacking
specific precedent, concluded that the plain meaning of § 2000e(b), in
particular the "any agent" language, confirmed that individual supervi-
sors were liable under Title VII.39  In more recent decisions, courts
have held individual supervisors liable if they exercised significant
control over traditional employee duties.' For example, in Sauers v.
Salt Lake County,4 the court held a supervisor liable if he or she
"exercise[d] significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or
condition of employment."42 Likewise, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North
America,43 the court said the purpose of supervisor liability is to hold
those liable who have "power over the plaintiff which exceeds that of
mere co-workers."'  Some courts have refined this approach by stating
that, "[t]he supervisory employee need not have ultimate authority to
hire or fire to qualify as an employer, as long as he or she has significant
input into such personnel decisions."45 Generally, these courts accept
agency principles, rather than only respondeat superior principles, as the
proper interpretation of § 2000e(b).
35. Id.
36. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
37. 684 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1982).
38. Id. at 362.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1995); Garcia v. Elf Atochem
N.A., 28 F.3d 446,451 (5th Cir. 1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.
1993).
41. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
42. Id. at 1125 (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp. 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), affd
in pertinent part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc)) (stating that, "[i]n such a situation, the
individual operates as the alter ego of the employer . .
43. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
44. Id. at 451.
45. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104 (citing Tafoga v. Adams, 612 F. Supp. 1097, 1105 (D.Colo.
1985), affd, 816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir.)).
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C. Courts That Fall Somewhere in the Middle
While some circuits clearly fall on one side of the issue of supervisor
liability, others struggle to articulate unified principles. For example, the
Fifth Circuit has issued conflicting decisions regarding supervisor
liability.' In Grant v. Lone Star Co.,47 the court refused to extend
liability for an individual supervisor because individual liability was
contrary to Congressional intent.4' However, approximately two
months later, the Fifth Circuit stated that a supervisor who exercises
"power over the plaintiff which exceeds that of mere co-workers" is
individually liable under Title VI. 49
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit is also in conflict on the
issue of supervisor liability. In Paroline v. Unisys Corp.,0 the Fourth
Circuit determined that an individual clearly qualifies as an employer
under the definition outlined in Title VII.5 ' A few years later, the
Fourth Circuit appeared to reverse Paroline in Birkbeck v. Marvel
Lighting Corp., 2 by rejecting supervisory liability under an ADEA
claim.53 Yet the Birkbeck court explicitly stated that its holding was
limited to personnel decisions of a "plainly delegable" character and an
individual supervisor may be liable in situations falling out of this
description. 4 Unfortunately, the Birkbeck court failed to explain what
qualifies as a "plainly delegable" decision.' The only guidance
available is that a decision to fire an employee is "plainly delegable"
and, therefore, a supervisor would not be individually liable in this
46. Compare Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct.
374 (1994), with Garcia, 28 F.3d at 446.
47. 21 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 1994).
48. Grant, 21 F.3d at 652-53.
49. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 451.
50. 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 104.
52. 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994).
53. Id. at 510.
54. Id. at 510 n. 1 (citing Paroline, 879 F.2d at 104; see also Shoemaker v. Metro Info.
Services, 910 F. Supp. 259, 265 (E.D. Va. 1996).
55. One court has interpreted the footnote in Birkbeck to mean that individual liability
should be imposed only in cases of sexual harassment. Mitchell v. RJK of Gloucester, Inc.,
899 F. Supp. 246, 248 (E.D. Va. 1995). Another court has drawn a distinction between age
discrimination and sexual harassment. Blankenship v. Warren County, 918 F. Supp. 970, 973
(W.D. Va. 1996). Blankenship implies that sexual harassment is somehow different than other
types of discrimination because the supervisor harasses "for his own benefit and not for that
of his employer." Id. (quoting Frye v. Virginia Transformer Corp., No. Civ.A 95-0399-R, 1995
WL 810018, at *2 (W.D. Va. Nov. 29, 1995)).
1997]
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circumstance.56 In a recent case attempting to clarify the Birkbeck
holding and its effect on Paroline, a federal district court stated that
"supervisors may be individually liable in Title VII cases where they
wield significant control over plaintiffs and their conduct cannot be
categorized as a plainly delegable duty., 57 In effect, these cases are
saying that where a supervisor exercises employer-like functions that are
not plainly delegable, that supervisor may be liable. The confusion in
these cases reinforces the need for the Supreme Court to articulate a set
of principles for lower courts to follow.
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES THAT COMPEL SUPERVISOR LIABILITY
The confusion generated by federal court decisions stems from their
improper application of the legal principles affecting the interpretation
of Title VII. Applying the proper rules of statutory construction, the
plain meaning of § 2000e(b) should be construed to impose individual
supervisor liability. Although an inquiry beyond the language seems
unnecessary, the legislative intent surrounding the passage of Title VII
supports supervisor liability as well.
A. - Plain Meaning of Title VII
The literal, plain language of Title VII confirms individual supervisor
liability and the statute should be enforced as written by Congress. As
mentioned earlier, Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employ-
ees ... and any agent of such person.""8 A cardinal rule of statutory
construction, as articulated by the Supreme Court, requires that "the
meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language
in which the act is framed., 59 Thus, the ordinary meaning of words
should not be abandoned unless there are compelling circumstances.'
Compelling circumstances would include a situation where the plain
language of a statute will lead to absurd results that are devoid of any
common sense.
61
Despite the applicable rules of statutory construction, courts
56. Stephens v. Kay Management Co., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 169, 171 (E.D. Va. 1995)
(interpreting the definition of employer under the ADA).
57. Shoemaker, 910 F. Supp. at 265.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
59. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
60. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1319 (2nd Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
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continually misconstrue § 2000e(b) to impose only respondeat superior
principles rather than pure agency principles.62 Courts abandon the
plain meaning of § 2000e(b) and fail to justify their decision by
demonstrating any absurd results that would occur if the "any agent"
language was given its literal meaning.
1. Respondeat Superior is an Incorrect Interpretation of § 2000e(b)
In Miller v. Maxwell's International Inc,63 the court said the "any
agent" language did not impose agency principles on supervisors, rather
it was a mere statement of respondeat superior.64  To support this
assertion, the Miller court looked to previous cases that accepted
supervisor liability and decided that those decisions "held individuals
liable only in their official capacities and not in their individual
capacities."65 The court felt this distinction warranted an interpretation
of § 2000e(b), particularly the "any agent" language, to only impose
respondeat superior principles.6 In other words, a supervisor's actions
are imputed to the employer, but the supervisor is not individually liable.
Though Miller was one of the first courts to reject supervisor liability,
other courts have followed Miller blindly on this issue.67 However, the
Miller court's distinction between a supervisor's "official" capacity and
"individual" capacity is a distinction without merit. Under an appropri-
ate theory of supervisor liability, a supervisor will never be sued only as
an individual, he or she must be acting with authority from the employer.
A supervisor and employer will be joined in a lawsuit, liable both jointly
and severally.
62. For a general discussion of agency principles, see infra notes 71-82 and accompanying
text.
63. 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
64. Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Birkbeck
v. Marvel Lighting, 30 F.3d 507,510 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994). When
interpreting the definition of an employer in the ADEA, the court said, "we read § 630(b) as
an unremarkable expression of respondeat superior-that discriminatory personnel actions
taken by an employer's agency may create liability for the employer." Id. For a definition of
respondeat superior, see supra note 27.
65. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 574 (1994). "In Miller, the court observed that the purpose of the 'agent' provision in
§ 2000e(b) was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into [T]itle VII." Id.; see also
Greenlaw v. Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc.,
55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995). As one author commented, "[i]n many cases it [case law]
involves little real legal analysis or appropriate policy considerations." Franke, supra note 21,
at 57.
1997]
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In addition, by imposing respondeat superior principles as the
meaning of "any agent," the language is reduced to superfluous words
without any apparent purpose.6" If Congress had not included the "any
agent" language in § 2000e(b), respondeat superior liability against
employers would still be imposed under common law principles. 69
However, at least one court commented that the reason for the "any
agent" language was to "ensure" that courts would impose respondeat
superior liability upon employers when an agent engaged in discriminato-
ry conduct." As a result, courts abandon the plain meaning of § 2000-
e(b) as well as the canons of statutory construction and impose
respondeat superior principles, reducing the "any agent" language to
words without any apparent purpose.
2. Agency Principles are the Correct Interpretation of § 2000e(b)
The plain language of Title VII's definition of employer invokes
individual supervisor liability under the agency theory. The words "and
any agent" in their true, ordinary everyday meaning clearly support the
use of agency principles. When drafting a statute, Congress chooses
words carefully. The words "any agent" indicate that principles of
agency are appropriate. More importantly, the Supreme Court
endorsed the use of agency principles in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.7
a. Restatement (Second) of Agency
The Restatement (Second) of Agency recognizes personal liability for
agents.7" According to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, an agent
"is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command
of the principal."'73 Applied in the context of Title VII, a supervisor is
not relieved from liability just because he or she was acting on behalf of
the employer. Instead, a supervisor who engages in discriminatory
conduct should be joined with the employer in Title VII actions.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that "[p]rincipal and
68. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1319 (2d Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., dissenting).
69. Id. Congress' inclusion of the "any agent" language to inform courts that respondeat
superior principles apply would be unnecessary and repetitions.
70. EEOC v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1281 (7th Cir. 1995).
71. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343 (1958).
73. Id. Similarly, absent a privilege, "[a]n agent who enters the land of another, defames
or arrests another, or does any similar act, is not excused by the mere fact that he is acting as
an agent." Id. § 343 cmt. b.
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agent can be joined in one action for a wrong resulting from the tortious
conduct of an agent or that of agent and principal, and a judgment can
issue against each."'74 In other words, under agency principles, agents
are personally liable for their actions. Given this language, a plaintiff
should be able to join an individual supervisor and employer in a single
action to hold both jointly and severally liable. However, only a
supervisor who actually engaged in prohibited discriminatory conduct will
be joined in a suit.7 The supervisor and employer are, in a sense,
considered a single actor and held liable for a single award.
b. Agency Principles Favored by Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue of supervisor
liability, the Court already endorsed agency principles in the context of
Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.76 In Meritor, the Supreme
Court acknowledged that Congress intended agency principles to impose
liability upon an employer for the acts of an individual supervisor.77
Meritor was a pivotal case in which an employee sued her employer after
being subjected to unwanted sexual attention from her supervisor over
a four year period. One of the issues before the Court concerned
whether, under the definition of "employer" in Title VII, an employer
could be liable for the actions of a supervisor in a hostile work environ-
ment claim.
The Court concluded that "Congress wanted courts to look to agency
principles for guidance in this area., 71 The Court particularly refer-
enced Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 219-237.8o Accordingly,
Meritor stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may hold a principal
liable for discriminatory conduct of an agent under agency principles.8"
Therefore, agency principles should be applied in the reverse situation;
74. Md § 359C(1) (1958).
75. Schallehn v. Central Trust & Say. Bank, 877 F. Supp. 1315, 1337 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
76. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
77. Id. at 72.
While the issue of individual liability for an employer's agent was not before the
Court in Meritor, its focus upon traditional agency principles suggests that joint and
several liability between an agent and his employer, thus individual liability for the
agent, is logically consistent with the Court's broader discussion of sexual harassment
actionable under Title VII.
Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1320 (Parker, J., dissenting).
78. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 59-60.
79. Id. at 72.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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an agent should be held individually liable for his or her actions, as well
as the principal.82 Any ruling to the contrary would conflict with the
precedent set forth in Meritor.
B. Legislative History/Legislative Intent
An inquiry beyond the statutory language should not proceed unless
there is "a clear showing that a literal reading of Title VII is at war with
itself, or an articulation of exceptional circumstances to justify further
judicial inquiry."'83 It is critical that the judiciary not go beyond the
words of a statute unnecessarily.' However, when the plain language
of the statute fails, legislative history and legislative intent are useful
tools to determine the proper interpretation of statutory language.
Although it is unnecessary to go beyond the plain language of § 2000e-
(b),85 the legislative intent of Title VII clearly shows that supervisor
liability is warranted. The legislative history of Title VII is unique
because only two committees in the House of Representatives reviewed
the legislation before it was sent to Congress for a final vote. 6 As a
result, the Congressional Record, rather than committee reports, contains
the legislative history of Title VII. 7
Legislative intent is expressed through the fifteen employee threshold
requirement, the remedies available under Title VII, the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the liability imposed under § 1981 of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1866.
1. Fifteen Employee Threshold
Courts that reject individual supervisor liability under Title VII"
combat the plain meaning of the statute by pointing to the fact that Title
82. Schallehn, 877 F. Supp. at 1336.
83. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1319 (Parker, J., dissenting).
84. Id.
85. Id. "Here, the statute speaks with such clarity that there is no need to look beyond
the statutory language in an attempt to divine Congressional intent." Id.
86. Phillip L. Lamberson, Personal Liability for Violations of Title VII: Thirty Years of
Indecision, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 419, 426 (1994).
87. Id. at 426 (citing Francis J. Vaas, Title VI. Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. &
COM. L. Rnv. 431, 457-58 (1966)).
88. See, e.g., Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993). Miller was one
of the first well-known cases that eliminated supervisors as possible defendants in an employ-
ment discrimination suit. For a more in-depth discussion of Miller and subsequent cases see
Cristopher Greer, "Who Me?": A Supervisor's Individual Liability for Discrimination in the
Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1839-1845 (1994). For a discussion of the
shortcomings of the Miller decision, see Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1318-24 (Parker, J., dissenting).
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VII limits liability to employers who have fifteen or more employees. 9
Accordingly, courts have asserted that an individual supervisor is not
included within Title VII's definition of employer because of the fifteen
employee threshold requirement.90 These courts state that Congress
apparently did not want to burden small businesses and individual
employees with the costs associated with litigating employment
discrimination claims.91 According to the Miller court, "[i]f Congress
decided to protect small entities with limited resources from liability, it
is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil liability to run
against individual employees."92
Yet, there are other more credible interpretations of why Congress
included the fifteen employee threshold requirement within Title VII.
When Title VII was enacted, small businesses comprised a substantial
portion of the economy and Congress did not want to disrupt the overall
stability of the economy.93 In other words, Congress was concerned
about the overall effect Title VII would have on the economy, not the
potential burden placed on businesses to litigate Title VII claims. For
example, an amendment was added to Title VII to raise the minimum
employee threshold to 100 employees because some members of the
Senate were concerned about Title VII's effect on free enterprise.94 In
response to the amendment, Senator Humphrey remarked, "under the
bill as now drafted [with a twenty-five employee threshold, later
amended to fifteen], 92 percent of the employers of America would not
be covered .... That cannot be regarded as a drastic imposition on the
business community."95 Furthermore, Congress was concerned about
intruding upon small family-run businesses that have very few employees,
many of whom are often relatives.96
A more persuasive reason for the fifteen employee threshold
requirement included in Title VII is evidenced by the Congressional
Record. The fifteen employee threshold was included in Title VII to
89. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
90. See Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314;
Lenhardt, 55 F.3d at 381.
91. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314; Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507,510 (4th
Cir. 1994).
92. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587; see also Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir.
1994).
93. See 110 CONG. REc. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). In 1964, businesses
with less than 25 employees comprised 92% of businesses. Id.
94. 110 CONG. REc. 13,088 (1964).
95. Id.
96. ME
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justify the passage of Title VII under the Commerce Clause.97 Given
the fact Title VII was the first wide-sweeping employment legislation of
its time, Congress was obviously concerned about its constitutionality
under the Commerce Clause. Clearly, by limiting Title VII liability to
employers who had over fifteen employees, Congress felt more confident
that Title VII would pass constitutional muster.
Some critics argue that if supervisor liability was intended, that intent
surely would be evidenced in the Congressional Record or the committee
reports.9" But why should Congress debate an issue that was so clearly
expressed through their use of the language "and any agent"? The lack
of debate over the issue instead points to the opposite conclusion:
Congress intended agent liability all along. Congress's silence, coupled
with the fact Congress has never amended Title VII to exclude
supervisor liability, is further proof that supervisors are liable under Title
VII.
2. Remedial Scheme of Title VII
As enacted, and later amended in 1972, Title VII outlines the
remedies available to plaintiffs in § 2000e-5(g).99 In particular, a court
can issue an injunction to stop an unlawful employment practice, order
the reinstatement or hiring of employees, authorize back pay, or provide
other suitable relief deemed appropriate by the court."° At least one
court stated that these remedies, like back pay and reinstatement, could
only be provided by an employer. Therefore, individuals could not be
held liable under Title VII.1° 1 However, the fact that the remedies are
not symmetrical is not a reason to deny individual liability. An
individual could easily be assessed a portion of back pay along with the
employer in an adverse judgment.
It is also helpful to consider how the remedial scheme of Title VII
evolved through the legislative process."° The final version of Title
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 6566 (1964); 110 CONG. REC.
6548 (1964); Id. at 7052, 7054 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Id. at 7088 (remarks of Sen.
Stennis); Id. at. 7207-12 (remarks of Sen. Clark). Understandably, Congress was concerned
about the constitutionality of Title VII legislation, especially given the current political and
societal climate in the country at the time.
98. See Clara J. Montanari, Supervisor Liability Under Title VII: A "Feel Good" Judicial
Decision, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 351, 361 (1996).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
100. Id. This section was later amended further by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see
infra notes 109-121 and accompanying text.
101. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1314.
102. See generally Franke, supra note 21, at 40-47.
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VII was a series of compromises put together on the floor of the
chamber."°  In effect, the compromises resulted in Title VII being
enforced by private individuals through private lawsuits, rather than a
public right enforced through a federal agency with strong enforcement
powers, as originally written.14 Despite this compromise, Title VH's
remedial provisions were never redrafted to correspond with the shift to
private, rather than public enforcement. As one scholar stated,
"although the responsibility of enforcement was shifted to the shoulders
of private individuals, the remedy conceived in conjunction with public
agency enforcement was all that was granted."'" Despite Congress'
attempt to reconcile these differences in 1972, Title VII was only
amended to allow the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission"°7
to bring suit against employers."° While this string of compromises
does not, per se, demonstrate Congressional intent to hold individuals
liable under Title VII, it does show why particular remedies remained in
the final version of Title VII. Therefore, by declaring that the remedies
available under Title VII are only applicable to employers, those who
reject supervisor liability fail to take into account the complex history of
Title VII's passage.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1991
The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (hereinafter the CRA of
1991) further supports the notion that individual supervisors are liable
under Title VII. The CRA of 1991 expands the remedies available to
plaintiffs in cases of intentional discrimination." 9 In addition to the
103. See Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title VII
Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.. 1301, 1315 (1990).
104. Id. at 1315-16.
105. Id. at 1316.
106. Franke, supra note 21, at 43.
107. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the federal agency
charged with overseeing the administration of anti-discrimination laws.
108. Franke, supra note 21, at 44-45.
109. Title VII outlines the relief available to plaintiffs:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay.., or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994).
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remedies already recognized under Title VII," ° the CRA of 1991
allows plaintiffs to recover punitive damages"' and compensatory
damages."' Compensatory and punitive damages are just as easily
enforced against individuals as employers, and, therefore, infer individual
liability for Title VII claims. "' However, in Miller, the court stated
that the caps imposed on compensatory damages, which staggered
according to the size of the employer," 4 prove that Congress did not
intend individual liability."5 It is impossible to know what Congress
intended by imposing caps on compensatory damages as there is no
discussion of the caps in the official legislative history."6 It has been
suggested that the floor debate on the CRA of 1991 revolved around the
overall economic effect of imposing compensatory and punitive damages
on employers, rather than avoiding liability for individuals."' The
110. 42U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). "A complaining partymay recover punitive damages... if
the complaining party demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory prac-
tice ... with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual." Id.
111. Title VII, as originally enacted, allowed injunctive relief, appropriate affirmative
action, reinstatement or hiring of an employee, back pay, or other suitable relief. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2)-(3). Any compensatory damages awarded are in addition
to remedies available under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2).
113. For a general discussion regarding the impact of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on
supervisor liability, see Michael D. Moberly & Linda H. Miles, The Impact of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 on Individual Title VII Liability, 18 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 475 (1993). The
authors argue that the Act does not necessarily impose liability on individuals and that the
decision should be left to Congress, not the courts. Id. at 501-503.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The statute provides:
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss
of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party.
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and fewer than 101
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $50,000.
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $100,000; and
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
Id.
115. Miller, 991 F.2d at 587-88 n.2.
116. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (Parker, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
117. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (Parker, J., dissenting).
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concerns expressed by Congress when enacting the CRA of 1991 were
very similar to the concerns expressed about imposing the fifteen
employee threshold when Title VII was originally enacted."' The
overriding concern was protecting the overall economy rather than
protecting individuals from liability. Moreover, individuals will not bear
the damages alone as their liability is imputed to the employer. Under
agency principles, both employer and employee are jointly and severally
liable."9 Still, some argue that Congress's silence in the CRA of 1991
regarding individual liability is conclusive proof that individual liability
was not intended."2 However, this argument assumes that individuals
were not liable prior to the passage of the CRA of 1991. Clearly, based
on the original language of Title VII, individual supervisors were liable
prior to the enactment of the CRA of 1991, and Congress had no reason
to clarify its position.' More importantly, Congressional silence is not
conclusive of any argument.
4. Section 1981 Remedial Measures
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866"l gives all persons,
regardless of race, the right to make and enforce contracts.'3 Section
1981 has been interpreted to prohibit intentional race discrimination by
both public and private employers. 24 Consequently, an employee who
is the subject of intentional discrimination may bring an action under
§ 1981 as well as Title VII.'" Under § 1981, an individual is personally
liable for intentional discrimination." Therefore, in a jurisdiction that
does not recognize individual liability under Title VII, a plaintiff could
bring a claim against a supervisor under § 1981.127 Because Congress
118. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
119. Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1323 (Parker, J., dissenting).
120. See Montanari, supra note 98, at 365-68.
121. See supra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). The statute provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
Id. § 1981(a),
123. Id.
124. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
125. See Kotkin, supra note 103, at 1348.
126. See, ag., Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir. 1986).
127. Lamberson, supra note 86, at 429.
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recognizes individual liability under § 1981, a statute with objectives
similar to Title VII, it seems logical that Congress would also endorse
individual liability under Title VII. As one justice noted, "[i]f individual
liability for discriminatory acts was truly beyond the contemplation of
Congress, it had ample opportunity to correct those courts which have
permitted such liability. Instead, [Congress] reaffirmed the breadth of
liability under § 1981." '
IV. SUPERVISOR LIABILITY IS SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
Imposing liability on individual supervisors as well as employers
achieves important social goals. Supervisor liability deters supervisors
from engaging in unlawful discrimination. Also, supervisor liability
provides plaintiffs with an alternative remedy when an employer is
unable to fully compensate the plaintiff. Lastly, supervisor liability is
consistent with notions of fairness and justice inherent in our legal
system.
A. Deterrence
Supervisor liability deters individual employees from violating anti-
discrimination laws because supervisors will fear exposure to liability.29
Common sense dictates that if an employee will be held personally
responsible for his or her wrongful actions, he or she will be less likely
to act in a wrongful manner. However, some argue that supervisor
liability is not necessary to deter individual employees. 3 Rather, the
market place will take care of these wrong-doers.' 3' For instance, in
Miller, the court opined that an employer would likely fire an employee
who violates Title VII. "An employer that has incurred civil damages
because one of its employees believes he can violate Title VII with
impunity will quickly correct that employee's erroneous belief", 132
While there is some credence to allowing the free market to take care
of supervisors who discriminate, this argument misses the point of Title
128. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1324 (2d Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., dissenting).
Congress reaffirmed the breadth of § 1981 in the CRA of 1991. See supra notes 108-121 and
accompanying text.
129. Scott B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Managers and Supervisors: Recognizing Agent
Liability Under Title VII, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 571, 584-85 (1994).
130. See Montanari, supra note 98, at 371. The author argues, in effect, that supervisors
terminated for engaging in discrimination will be unable to secure other employment. Id.
131. See Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1995); see also
Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l. Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1993).
132. Miller, 991 F.2d at 588.
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VII. Anti-discrimination laws seek to provide a remedy to disadvantaged
groups in the workforce when market forces are ill-equipped to address
the unfair discrimination. As one court noted, "[t]he spirit of Title VII
would become attenuated if it were forced to rely on market to persuade
employers to correct the discriminatory conduct of their employees."''
If the best employees were always hired, retained, and treated fairly,
there would be no need for laws like Title VII. Therefore, to hope that
market forces will take care of supervisors who discriminate is not only
naive, but misguided based on our country's history.
B. Supervisor Liability Increases Chances of Recovery
Plaintiffs should not be denied recovery merely because an employer
is unable to compensate the victim due to bankruptcy or some other
hardship. It is easy to imagine a situation where an employee is awarded
a judgment and the employer subsequently goes bankrupt, leaving the
plaintiff without a remedy. Similarly, supervisor liability provides an
additional remedy for plaintiffs when an employer is "capable of only
partial satisfaction of [an] adverse judgment[."''  Meanwhile, the
actual wrong-doer, the individual supervisor is allowed to escape any
liability. Rather than leave the plaintiff without recourse, a plaintiff
should be allowed to seek compensation or other relief from an
individual supervisor who engaged in discriminatory conduct.
C. Tortfeasors Should be Held Responsible
The foundation of our legal system is that wrongdoers should be held
responsible for their actions. 5  By immunizing supervisors from
answering for their discriminatory tactics, a supervisor is allowed to keep
acting in this manner. The employer/employee relationship should not
protect supervisors when they engage in reprehensible conduct. By
protecting supervisors, the courts are sending the wrong message to
supervisors. In effect, the message being sent is that it is okay to violate
Title VII because the employer will bear any responsibility for discrimi-
nating acts, not the employee. If this is the case, supervisors are free to
either remain at their present employment, or look for new employment,
where they are capable of discriminating again. Our legal system should
not protect this kind of conduct.
133. Shoemaker v. Metro Info. Services, 910 F. Supp. 259, 266 (E.D. Va. 1996).
134. Goldberg, supra note 129, at 583.
135. See generally, ag., OLIVER WENDELL. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW &
OTHERWRmINGS 80-84 (1881) cited with an approval in Goldberg, supra note 129, at 571 n.2.
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A common question is why an employee might name an individual
supervisor when, most likely, an employer is the one who has the
resources to compensate a wronged employee. Employees name
individual supervisors in lawsuits for a variety of reasons, but mostly
because they want a supervisor to answer for his or her actions. A
plaintiff will rarely receive additional damages by naming an individual
supervisor in a Title VII claim, unless the employer is unable to
compensate the plaintiff fully for his or her damages.'36 Understand-
ably, some plaintiffs may be motivated by revenge37 after suffering
humiliating and demeaning harassment from a supervisor.138
IV. JUDICIAL TEST FOR SUPERVISOR LIABILITY
Based on the above arguments, supervisors should be liable under
Title VII when they engage in discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, the
courts need to develop a practical test to determine under what
circumstances a supervisor will incur liability. In Schallehn v. Central
Trust,139 the court fashioned a three-prong test for individual supervisor
liability under an ADEA claim."4  Under this test, a supervisor is
liable when: (1) the supervisor is an agent of the employer, such that he
or she meets the definition of agency, (2) the employer satisfies the
requisite minimum threshold requirement for employees, and (3) the
agent violated a portion of Title VII.141 If these three prongs are
satisfied, an employer and employee can be joined in an action and be
held jointly and severally liable. 42
The first prong requires the supervisor to be an "agent" of the
employer. Several courts have created criteria to determine when a
supervisor qualifies as an agent.43 In addition to looking to agency
136. See Lamberson, supra note 86, at 420. A plaintiff may be unable to recover
damages from an employer if that employer subsequently goes bankrupt.
137. Id. at 420-21.
138. For example, in Shoemaker, a supervisor continually propositioned the plaintiff for
sexual favors at an office social function. Shoemaker, 910 F. Supp. at 262. The supervisor
followed her to her car, asked that they get a hotel room, and made additional offensive
comments to her. lId
139. 877 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
140. Id. at 1337-38. The test is easily applied to a Title VII claim or an ADA claim as
well.
141. This test was outlined by the court in Schallehn, 877 F. Supp. at 1333.
142. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 359C (1957).
143. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1994); Sauers
v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993)
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principles for guidance, the court in Sauers v. Salt Lake County'" said
an individual is an "employer" for purposes over § 2000e(b) "if he or she
serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the
plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment."' 45 Another court
said "agents must be the equivalent or near-equivalent of true employers:
persons who exercise employer-like functions vis-A-vis the employees
who complain of those persons' unlawful conduct."' 6 By requiring the
agent to engage in similar tasks as an employer, liability for mere co-
workers is eliminated. 47 Only those supervisors that exercise signifi-
cant control over an employee will be held liable. There is no legitimate
reason why supervisors who accept additional responsibilities from an
employer should not be held responsible for unlawfully discriminating
against subordinates. In addition, this prong eliminates the confusion
resulting from the Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp.'" holding that
supervisors are not liable when they engage in plainly delegable
duties.'49 As "plainly delegable" duties is an ambiguous concept, it
provides little guidance for courts.
The second prong of the test requires the employer to meet the
requisite employee threshold requirement outlined in § 2000e(a).
Therefore, the employer must have at least fifteen employees in order
for an individual supervisor to be liable. This prong maintains the
Congressional objectives of constitutionality under the Commerce Clause
and protecting the overall economy.' If the employer does not meet
the minimum threshold, neither the employer nor the individual can be
held liable under Title VII.
The third prong requires the plaintiff to show that the individual
supervisor violated Title VII by engaging in conduct prohibited by Title
VII." A plaintiff could not name a supervisor in a suit merely
because he or she was a supervisor. That supervisor must have
individually violated a portion of Title VII. While the agent's conduct
is imputed to the employer by the wording of § 2000e(b), it would be
144. 1 F.3d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
145. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1125 (citations omitted) (quoting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879
F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989)).
146. Ball v. Renner, 54 F.3d 664, 668 (10th Cir. 1995).
147. The court in Garcia was careful not to extend liability to the extent that mere co-
workers would be held liable. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,451 (5th Cir. 1994).
148. 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 666 (1994).
149. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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contrary to public policy to hold an individual supervisor liable when he
or she did not violate the law. An analysis similar to that which is
applied to employers when determining a violation of Title VII would
apply when determining individual liability.
V. CONCLUSION
Individual supervisors should be liable under Title VII. The wide-
spread inconsistencies in the federal courts about the proper interpreta-
tion of § 2000e(b) requires the Supreme Court to resolve the question.
Many courts have ignored the plain meaning of the statute, the
legislative intent of Congress, and the compelling public policy arguments
favoring supervisor liability.
The three prong test to determine supervisor liability is both
equitable and easy to administer. The test is fair because it holds
supervisors responsible when they act like employers. Secondly, the test
still follows the mandate by Congress to only impose liability on
employers with more than fifteen employees. The test holds the
supervisor liable for his or her actions, not just the employer who may
have had little or no control over the supervisor's actions.
Although some critics may argue that this test will push supervisors
into bankruptcy satisfying adverse judgments, the practical effects of this
test, in all actuality do not change the dynamics of Title VII suits.
Employers are still the entities with "deep pockets" and will be the
entities responsible for satisfying the judgment. Although there may be
issues of contribution from the supervisor, that inquiry requires further
interpretation and scrutiny. To eradicate discrimination from the
workplace, supervisors must be part of the equation. By holding
individual supervisors liable, we can finally hope to end discrimination
in the workplace.
KATHRYN K. HENSIAK
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